


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THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE FUTURE

LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
BY A GROUP OF FORMER OFFICIALS
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS



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FOREWORD

As the victory of the United Nations draws nearer, problems connected with the establishment and functioning of international organizations will increasingly engage the attention of students of international affairs.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs has been happy to offer facilities for a study of what may be called the administrative problems of international organization. The study has been undertaken by a group of persons, who, as former officials of the League of Nations Secretariat, have direct experience of how international machinery works. Its object is to draw the practical lessons of that experience.

Though primarily concerned with administration, the authors of the study inevitably make certain assumptions regarding the broader issues of policy on which administrative action depends. For these, as for all the views expressed and proposals made, they alone are responsible. The part of the Institute, in publishing their report, is to help to crystallize and inform the public discussion of these questions. Whatever may be the nature or form of post-war international organizations, the men and women who will be called upon to serve them will be faced with problems closely similar to those examined in this report.

ASTOR

Chairman of the Council.

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January 1944.

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE maintenance of peace and of conditions permitting a decent life for the individual depends upon the policies of Governments. If the lessons of recent years have been learned, those policies will be governed by agreed principles of action in the fields of security and of social and economic progress. When we contemplate the vast scope of the agreements which Governments will have to make on these all-important matters, and the great movements of public opinion which must sustain them, the question of the machinery for carrying them out appears a minor matter. And so it is, but though it is a small arc in the circle—opinion, policy, machinery—it is an essential one. Without it the circle is broken, and action is inefficient or uncertain.

In domestic affairs even among the greatest States an inadequate or out-of-date civil service may lead to unwarranted reactions against desirable policies. In the field of international relations an adequate machine is not less necessary.

An international organization, taken as a whole, normally consists of three parts: (a) the policy-making organ or organs—conference, assembly, council, governing body, senate, or whatever else it may be called—composed of the representatives of the states which constitute the organization; (b) the committees which advise the policy-making organs, especially on matters requiring technical knowledge; and (c) the administrative machinery, that is to say the agents directly employed by the organization, especially its permanent secretariat,¹ which assists both the directing and the advisory organs and is responsible for the execution of all decisions. It is with the third organ that we are mainly concerned in this study, though one chapter (Chapter II) relates to wider aspects of the international framework.

Before discussing the nature of international machinery, the relations between these three parts, and especially the exact functions

¹ *Terminology*: "Secretariat" with a capital "S" refers throughout this report to the League of Nations Secretariat. Not capitalized "secretariat", unless otherwise qualified, refers to the administrative branch of the new international organization as an institution. "Service" refers to the working body of officials in the secretariat. Similarly, "head of the secretariat" and "head of the service" refer to the official whose position would be roughly analogous to that held by the Secretary General of the League.

of the advisory committees, should be clearly understood. In a system of co-operating States, representatives in the policy-making organ are, of necessity, selected primarily for their abilities as negotiators. Advice on the technical aspects of the various problems which arise must be procured through permanent or *ad hoc* committees or commissions. Their functions have two aspects. When the matter for consideration is purely technical, and national views are of minor importance, as in the case of many health problems, the committee is merely advisory to the policy-making body; but when national policies are integral to the problem, as in the case of international control of civil aviation, it must also serve as a preliminary clearing-house of national views. These advisory bodies may be regarded as a projection, on the one hand of governmental, on the other of secretariat, machinery. They are the field of interaction between the national and the international services. The efficiency of the latter depends greatly on its ability to serve and profit by the former. It cannot do their work itself, and if it tries to do so confusion and inefficiency will result.

There are certain important differences in the conditions under which official machinery for international and for national action, respectively, operates.

In the first place it is implicit in a system based on agreements between sovereign States that decisions by policy-making organs require the concurrence of all their members except where otherwise provided in the agreements themselves. It is true that such exceptions can be widely extended. It is true also that, where unanimity is required, conclusions endorsed by majority votes at the earlier stages of discussion are often accepted even by dissentient States when the stage of final decision is reached. Nevertheless, until a workable compromise in regard to the unanimity rule is achieved, international administrative machinery will continue to have the additional burden of trying to clear the ground for agreement in the policy-making organs.

Secondly, while a national executive is capable of carrying out by its own resources the work which the policy-making organ instructs it to do, an international service has at its disposal no direct means of action corresponding to the great body of national public ser-

vants, whose duty it is to give immediate effect to the decisions of their Government. For the decisions of international bodies to have a real effect on the lives of the peoples, national administrations must implement them. To provide an international organization with extensive direct means of action, e.g. a police force directly subordinate to it, raises administrative problems of a wholly different order from those for which any comparable experience has existed hitherto, though this does not mean that such problems could not be solved.

Thirdly, experts drawn from outside the ranks of the regular staff play a great part in the preparation of international decisions. The formulation and execution of policy on an international scale require, therefore, a machine of a highly elastic character, capable of being rapidly extended for special purposes, and of being reduced again, without weakening the machine as a whole, when the special activity is completed. A central and permanent secretariat provides the necessary continuity and accumulation of experience and knowledge; but the equally necessary power of expansion and contraction depends on the collaboration of Governments.

These comparisons may help to explain the kind of work which the official machine will be called on to perform, and the essential nature of its action. It must of course be understood that the extent and efficacy of that action depend on the existence of an adequate measure of agreement between Governments. In war-time we see international decisions of the most far-reaching character taken over a vast range of strategic, political and economic subjects. In peacetime action of this scope and diversity cannot be taken so quickly. Not only are the evil consequences of inaction much less obvious and immediate, but more countries have to be brought in. It is important to realize that the willingness to allow two or three great Powers to take decisions materially affecting the interests of other associated nations does not exist in anything like the same degree in peace as in war. However, it may be hoped that something of the impetus of co-operation achieved by the United Nations to meet the problems of war may be carried forward into the peace.

The work of an international secretariat may be said to have four main aspects: (a) secretarial assistance for international meetings.

This includes the preparation of meetings and the collection and presentation of facts on which decisions can be based, as well as the following up and supervision of the execution of such decisions; (b) the accumulation and use of technical and special knowledge for these and other purposes; (c) negotiation, or the smoothing away of difficulties with a view to promoting agreement; and (d) administration of the internal economy.

Secretarial assistance for international meetings: This involves not only the routine preparation and service for the meetings but also the preparation of pertinent documents and reports for the use of delegates, the presentation of information required for each meeting, and the secretarial execution of decisions during the next interim period. Described in such bare terms, these primary functions seem simple enough. But their importance may be extended to an almost indefinite degree. As an example, the phrase "preparation of reports for the use of delegates" would include such documents as the annual Reports presented to the League Assembly by the Secretary General and to the I.L.O. Conference by the Director. These provided the text of the chief debates in each body, and furnished delegates with all the material they required for the discussion of past and future policy.

Special knowledge: Much of the service's energy is devoted to the study of technical and political problems for the use of the policy-making organs, advisory committees, special conferences, governments, and the general public. As servant of many Governments, it has unique opportunities of securing material which is not easily, if at all, available elsewhere. It must develop to the full the technique of collecting, analysing and using such material.

Negotiation: Although this function may not officially be admitted to belong to an international secretariat, it is of the very essence of the work of the higher officials, and unless it is duly performed little progress in international business, whether in the political or technical sphere, is likely. Chairmen of committees, rapporteurs, and individual delegates are no doubt the most effective negotiators in the questions with which they are concerned. But they also require the help and advice of the secretariat, as the only continuously operative

element in the organization, and the only one which can be in touch with all the interests affected.

Administration of the internal economy needs no comment here except that it is more difficult for a secretariat composed of many nationalities than for a national administration.

Practical discussion of the problems of international administration will obviously centre round the experience of the League of Nations, including the International Labour Office and the Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice as well as the Secretariat, since these alone were planned and operated on a scale of variety, importance and permanence in any way comparable to the organization which we have in mind. The close inspection to which every part of their machinery was exposed invests them, moreover, with a unique interest for this purpose.

The first question which must be asked—and the answer is fundamental to the whole of our study—is whether their twenty-year experience shows that efficient international action on the service plane is possible. *A priori* many people were inclined to doubt this and to believe that anything like an international civil service would be hopelessly handicapped by the lack of a sufficient *esprit de corps*, and that even if the necessary good will were present, the difficulty of mutual understanding, the clash of traditional systems, and the inequalities of administrative experience, would render the machine inefficient.

Without claiming perfection for the League's administrative machine, we submit that it has been decisively proved by experience that these fears were unjustified and that if there is agreement on policy an efficient international service can be organized to carry it out. It would be easy to illustrate this point by many quotations both from official statements of Governments and from unofficial publications. We take one example from a recent book which is not, generally speaking, particularly favourable to the League: "The permanent Secretariat at Geneva functioned admirably under a secretary general and an efficient civil service. . . The Secretariat believed in the League and served it with most efficient zeal."¹

¹ Hoover and Gibson, *Problems of a Lasting Peace*, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1942, pp. 154, 156.

Though these declarations refer most specifically to the Secretariat they undoubtedly apply to the whole machine of which the Secretariat was the centre.

Dissension within the ranks of the responsible leaders will be reflected perhaps more quickly in an international than in a national service. Such tendencies must be counterbalanced by the maintenance of an *esprit de corps* inspired, firstly, by the knowledge that in serving loyally, and to the utmost of his ability, an international organization, the official is also making the best contribution he can to the ultimate happiness and progress of his own country; and, secondly, by the consciousness of doing a worth-while job. No civil service, international or national, can, however, function without a reasonably clear mandate from the policy-making organs. It cannot produce unity out of strife, though it can do a good deal to prevent strife over secondary questions. Finding agreement on a particular subject unobtainable, national delegates may be tempted to refer it to experts, nominally in the expectation that they will find a solution satisfying all points of view, but really in order to gain time and keep the real conflict in the background. Such a practice imposes on the experts, whether working as a committee or as part of the secretariat, a responsibility which they are not equipped to fulfil. But if an international service is properly instructed either to execute a particular decision or to study a particular question, or if it is performing a recognized routine of work, the fact of it being internationally staffed is no handicap to its complete efficiency.

It is submitted that this conclusion is of great importance for the peace-makers. It means that in all their planning they can take it for granted that an efficient international administration can be set up to carry out their plans, provided that in this field just as in the greater field of policy, they on their side are prepared to create and maintain the necessary conditions. What these conditions are, we shall try to consider in the present report. They may prove to involve something of what is sometimes called "sacrifice," i.e. some change in the prestige and power of the national civil services as compared with the international service. This "sacrifice" however would be amply repaid by the increased efficiency which the

national services can derive from making use of the international machine in appropriate ways. This fact was increasingly understood, in the case of the League Secretariat, by the national civil services, which consequently came to give it a high degree of approval and support.

II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Current discussion on future international organization abounds with references to universalism, regionalism, joint functional boards, the Four Powers, federations great and small, and to what would in effect be a return to nineteenth-century balance of power. Although the present study is concerned only with the relatively restricted subject of the future international secretariat and the administrative problems which will arise in that connection, some postulates must be laid down as to the nature of the organization which the secretariat is designed to serve. It is clear that the League of Nations Secretariat, for example, would have presented a fundamentally different picture had the League been nothing more than a co-ordinating body for several regionally organized blocs, or if it had been entrusted with only security and political functions, on the one hand, or, on the other, with only welfare and technical functions.

Our first postulate is that the future international organization will be based largely on the concept of sovereign States. Observation of the actual strength of the feeling for national independence compels us to recognize that sovereign States are likely to remain, for as long as we can plan now, the elements of international order or disorder. The Atlantic Charter rests on this assumption, and the Four Power Declaration of Moscow specifically affirms it. The actual number of sovereign States in the world and, therefore, any alleged dangers which may flow from the mere fact of their multiplicity will be reduced if the advice sometimes tendered to some smaller States to federate is accepted; but even so the general world picture would not be radically changed. The immediate international issue will consequently continue to be how to promote better co-operation

among sovereign entities, not how to abolish them. Success in voluntary co-operation may lead States gradually to transfer more aspects of their sovereignty to the international organization than they are at present prepared to do.

Secondly, the practical impossibility of separating the problems either of peace or of welfare into watertight regional compartments points to the need of a world-wide organization. At first sight it may seem "reasonable" and "workable" to base organization on geographical propinquity, which is supposed to lead to a community of outlook and interest; but the real reason for proposals for a North Atlantic Bloc, a Pacific Bloc, Western or Eastern European Blocs is, admittedly, strategic; it is assumed that the bloc in question will have within it, and co-operate for defence purposes with, one or more of the Great Powers. It is difficult to see how a satisfactory settlement can rest on such arrangements. The world-wide nature of major strategic problems has been demonstrated by events, and there is no geographical bloc, however favourably situated, within which aggression would not be facilitated if great areas in other parts of the world had no obligation to join in preventing it. Unless the whole attempt to organize security were abandoned, Powers of world-wide interests could in no case remain unconcerned by a threat to peace, nor could they in practice be included in two or more different and unco-ordinated blocs. Nor could other States, with perhaps a few exceptions, renounce all interest in the maintenance of peace outside their own area. These considerations apply with equal force to economic relations and to the problems of world communications. If however they prove, as we believe, that an effective system of security must be organized in a world-wide form, this by no means excludes the possibility of regional arrangements for defence within the framework of "a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations."¹

It is sometimes argued that regional organization is a first step towards universal organization; but there is a danger of crystallization on regional lines which would create vested interests in regionalism, and thus obstruct further development. There are other and

¹ Winston Churchill, broadcast, 21 March 1943.

greater dangers. For isolationists, wherever found, regionalism is attractive because it affords a pretext for indifference to what happens outside the closed circle. Conversely it appeals to those who believe in the *Herrenvolk* idea and seek to impose their will on neighbouring States, since in this case too the closed circle favours the application of their philosophy.

For certain classes of problems such as overland communications and power projects, regional organization is desirable and inevitable; but even here complete dissociation from a world-wide plan would probably involve certain disadvantages. As regards political problems, any formal or permanent regionalization is to be avoided; but preliminary treatment of particular, local questions by an *ad hoc* delegation of authority from the central organ to a regional agency might on occasion be applied profitably. It would meet the indifference of small States to distant problems and their special interest in affairs nearer at hand. At the same time the ultimate authority of the central organ must be so clear that no opportunity is given for one party in a dispute to obstruct or drag out the settlement by playing upon a conflict of jurisdictions, as Italy utilized the imprecise position of the League's authority *vis-à-vis* the Council of Ambassadors during the Corfu affair in 1923, or as both parties in the Chaco dispute used the existence of regional machinery to hamper or paralyse League action. This does not mean that the consideration of a dispute by a regional body should be excluded any more than its consideration through ordinary diplomatic channels, if both parties prefer such procedure; but the right of either party to refer to the world organization should at all times remain intact.

A world-wide system is thus the only answer to the otherwise insoluble problem of overlapping regions and networks of regional memberships. It seems most probable that in actual fact post-war international organization will have this world-wide character, starting with the United Nations—themselves drawn from all parts of the world—and expanding rapidly to include neutral countries and ultimately the ex-enemy countries.

Thirdly, it is assumed that the international organization will cover both political and, for want of a better term, "welfare" questions, economic, health, transport, labour, and other "technical"

matters; in other words, that it will deal with all problems which possess an international aspect. It is impossible to draw a clear-cut line between political and security questions, on the one hand, and welfare questions on the other, just as the treatment of neither class of question, taken separately, can be divided into neat regional compartments. Whether Aristide Briand was correct in saying that "le politique domine l'économique" may be debatable. What is not debatable is that political questions and economic questions are inextricable and that most welfare questions are potentially political questions. President Roosevelt affirmed the necessary connection in his address to the delegates to the Hot Springs Conference. After noting the inter-relationship of various welfare problems, he continued:

In the political field these relationships are equally important. And they work both ways. A sound world agricultural program will depend upon world political security, while that security will, in turn, be greatly strengthened if each country can be assured of the food it needs. Freedom from want and freedom from fear go hand in hand.¹

A body of experts appointed by the League Council in 1938 to study economic depressions has recently come to a similar conclusion:

We have mentioned a number of international functions which will require to be performed by appropriate organs whether temporary or permanent. But . . . if we are to avoid international economic anarchism, an anarchism which would be rendered rather more than less dangerous by the existence of a number of high-powered but headless international organs, means must be found for co-ordinating their policies. Secondly, economic policy must be correlated with political. Economic issues form a major part of political life. All political action has economic effects. Military security cannot be devised in an economic vacuum, nor economic security in the face of the threat of war.²

The experience of the League confirms the importance of recognizing this connection. There were periods when only a small part of its energies and machinery was required for major political problems. Simultaneously, however, it was kept continuously occupied

¹ Department of State Bulletin, 12 June 1943.

² *The Transition from War to Peace Economy*, Report of the Delegation on Economic Depressions, Part I, League of Nations, May 1943, pp. 108-109.

by the vigorous and conscious development of its welfare functions. Had this not been so, political and security questions, when they did arise, would have found the machinery for their treatment rusty at best or even disintegrated, and the final breakdown should not cause us to forget the historical truth that this machinery was frequently used to good effect. Conversely, the agents of the League concerned with welfare problems derived strength from their association with a body which was political in character.

The considerable progress achieved by the League in its best days was indeed largely due to the fact that it was occupied with the whole gamut of international problems. It brought together for collaboration in Geneva and elsewhere experts and delegates from all over the world endowed with a great variety of experience. Representing different nationalities and having one common interest—the successful treatment of international problems—they helped to create an atmosphere conducive to practical co-operation both within and beyond the sphere of their immediate interests.

We are aware that this thesis of the organic connection between the political and the welfare aspects of international life is not universally accepted, and that there is a tendency in some quarters to treat as secondary the need for an organized system of security, while giving full support to the expansion of welfare organizations. But in our belief experience shows that unless the two interests mutually reinforce each other even more than did the political and the technical activities of the League itself and the I.L.O., each is likely to fail of its full effect.

This does not mean that, in our view, the only suitable method of organizing international life after the war is to create at once a unitary and highly integrated organization, complete in all its parts. Some persons propose that future international organization should be along the lines of joint agencies for particular problems, based on those set up during the war by the United Nations to deal with problems of raw materials, shipping, production and distribution of food, and so on. They envisage, perhaps correctly, an expansion of such *ad hoc* agencies both in their functions and in the number of participating Governments, and foresee their development into a pattern of international bodies

entrusted with the continuous treatment of specific problems and composed of representatives of the Governments interested in each problem.

Of this piecemeal method of approach without reference to an overall plan, we say only two things. First, for reasons already given, effective organizations for security and international justice must be linked to welfare organizations. Secondly, it would be clearly advantageous and economical to provide common legal, informational, translating and other services for the various agencies. Moreover it seems inevitable that an annual assembly would be needed to consider the past performance of the several agencies and to determine their budgets. It would be cumbersome and inefficient to review their work and determine their budgets separately. Thus although there may be in existence, soon after the war, more or less separate organizations dealing with such matters as labour, surface and air transport, raw materials, currency, commodity allocation, food, education, health, drug control, refugees, control of armaments and security, as well as a court of justice, most of these would in our view tend to become linked, sooner or later, in a general organization comprising at least a central secretariat and an annual assembly, in which all participating States would be represented.

A review of budgets almost inevitably involves a review of policy, and, given the wide range of subjects covered, an assembly for such a purpose would tend to become a political and not merely a budgetary or administrative body. Such a development seems to us not only inevitable but altogether desirable. We would point out with all the emphasis at our command that progress in welfare matters can ultimately be secured only if peace is assured, and that the primary and essential duty of any international organization must be to check any tendency towards aggression and to prevent aggression by force if need be.

III. SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

We are not concerned with the everyday administrative problems which are usually covered by a handbook of office rules. They are familiar to every administrator and appear in international

organization in much the same manner as in national or municipal services. But there are administrative problems which are peculiar to an international secretariat. These include, amongst others, the question of national representation¹ among the staff; of the composition and functions of the high directorate (chief officials); of relations with the public and with Governments; of language difficulties and the demands of national prestige. In other words, the points where politics intersects with administration delimit our area of inquiry. As a general rule, political implications will be found in those features of international administration, where close similarity to national administrations disappears.

The political-administrative problems thus delimited are, of course, closely connected one with another. The external relations of a secretariat, for example, cannot be considered without reference to the national composition of its staff. Some arbitrary classifications are however necessary, and our study is accordingly divided under the following broad headings: loyalties, national composition and recruitment; directorate of the service; external relations; languages; site of the organization; budget and financial problems.

IV. LOYALTIES, NATIONAL COMPOSITION AND RECRUITMENT

No attribute is more essential for an international secretariat than ability to gain and hold the confidence of member Governments and of public opinion. The greater the political importance of the organization, the more will its members demand as a condition of such confidence that the secretariat should include some of their own nationals. The Universal Postal Union, which has no political character, employs a mere handful of officials, and supplies an essential utility service for each of its members, is staffed nationally; and no one questions the all-Swiss personnel policy which applies in this case. The Pan-American Union, permanent organ of the Pan-

¹ "National representation" refers, in this study, merely to the presence in the service of nationals from a particular country, and does not mean representation in the diplomatic sense of advocating national policies, which we hope to show is inadmissible.

American system, is specifically prohibited from exercising political functions, but its activities are important in so many fields that its personnel are selected as far as possible from all the member States. Add political functions to the work of an international secretariat, and it will be strange indeed if all members do not exert strong pressure for representation¹ on its staff. Faith and confidence will be qualified or withheld altogether if one country or a small combination of countries monopolize the administrative and executive positions. National prestige is also involved in this question; so, too, is the natural desire to get full value out of membership in the organization.

The inevitable demands for wide distribution of positions will raise at the outset, for those who are charged with laying the bases of international administration, one real and one apparent dilemma. The apparent dilemma is whether the new secretariat should demand strict international loyalty from its employees or build on national loyalties, reflecting within the administrative unit the *inter*-national nature of the politically responsible body. The real dilemma is closely connected with this: should the efficiency of candidates receive priority over considerations of national distribution in the appointment of personnel?

INTERNATIONAL LOYALTY

What is "international loyalty"? It is not the denationalized loyalty of the man without a country. On the contrary, it is the conviction that the highest interests of one's own country are served best by the promotion of security and welfare everywhere, and the steadfast maintenance of that conviction without regard to changing circumstances. It is breadth of international outlook, which a well-placed observer aptly describes as "something quite different from the attitude ridiculed by Canning as that of 'a friend of every country but his own'." "The international outlook required of the international civil servant is," he continues, "an awareness made instinctive by habit of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of differently-circumstanced countries, as they are felt and expressed by the peoples concerned, accompanied by a capacity for

¹ See footnote, p. 17.

weighing these . . . elements in a judicial manner before reaching any decision to which they are relevant."¹

International loyalty is not, as some suppose, an unnatural or artificial sentiment. Though it is only from the staff of the secretariat that it must be explicitly demanded, League experience shows that it can also be developed quickly and indeed enthusiastically by others who have no formal duty to do so. Countless private individuals, journalists, experts, committee members and national delegates felt strongly the pull of international loyalty and, so far as their instructions allowed, gave devoted service to its cause.

The first Secretary General, when framing the scheme for the organization of the League Secretariat, decided that strict international loyalty² should be demanded of the staff, thus discarding the principle of national loyalty which underlay the existing secretariat of the Peace Conference and the Inter-Allied organizations. The experiment worked well until the League became the direct object first of subtle, then of open, sabotage. Whatever their final judgment of the League, observers agree that the concept of international loyalty is practicable,³ and we can affirm on empirical evidence that an administration based on international loyalty—to the organization in general and its secretariat in particular—can be highly efficient.

Experience shows that a spirit of international loyalty among public servants can be maintained in practice. It shows also that

¹ C. W. Jenks, Legal Adviser of the International Labour Office, *Some Problems of an International Civil Service*, Public Administration Review, III, No. 2, 1943, p. 95.

² Staff regulations were based on this premise throughout. "The officials of the Secretariat of the League of Nations are exclusively international officials and their duties are not national, but international. By accepting appointment, they pledge themselves to discharge their functions and to regulate their conduct with the interests of the League alone in view. They are subject to the authority of the Secretary General, and are responsible to him in the exercise of their functions. . . . They may not seek or receive instructions from any Government or other authority external to the Secretariat of the League of Nations." *Staff Regulations*, 1933, Article I.

³ The report of a special committee appointed by the Assembly to study the organization of the major administrative organs of the League substantiates this conclusion. Even those who submitted minority reports on other aspects agreed that, "in the course of the last ten years, proof has been given over and over again that it is possible to reckon on the existence of a body of good international officials, loyal to the League and ready to discharge faithfully the obligations which they accepted on entering its service." *Report of the Committee of Inquiry (Committee of Thirteen)*, Minutes of the Fourth Committee, Eleventh Assembly, 1930, p. 295.

Before the task of the given organization has been laid down it is not possible to consider the functions and composition of the high directorate of a secretariat from the point of view of the precise work it will have to do, but it is possible and worth while to set forth principles which should be applied to a central administrative unit whatever may be the specific tasks allotted to it.

It is clear that the responsible posts will be few in number and will command a high premium. Hence a fundamental question arises: should there be in practice, whether administrative efficiency requires it or not, a special category of high posts around the head of the service, created for the purpose of being filled by officials of particular nationalities and thus satisfying the demands of the leading Governments? In this form the question can only be answered negatively, but plausible affirmative arguments have been heard in the past and will undoubtedly be used in the future. Though nationals of the smaller countries must be included, it is essential that the secretariat's higher directorate should contain nationals of the major Powers, on whom the main responsibility for supporting the organization will fall. Their presence is necessary, not in order to champion the policies of their Governments—this is in no case admissible—but to explain the action or attitude of the secretariat to their Governments' representatives and *vice versa*, with that lack of reserve which is only possible between compatriots or members of a common service. The head of the service or the director of a particular section is in a stronger position towards principal member Governments if, at moments of difficulty, he can transmit the secretariat viewpoint with the assistance of a colleague from the country which needs persuasion or desires an explanation. Moreover, the chief official requires an advisory body which is intimate with conditions and traditions in the leading countries.

The presence of nationals from the leading States must however be justified administratively, because as the value of appointments for political reasons increases with rank, so also does the drag on efficiency caused by the existence of otherwise unwarranted posts. Assuming, then, that none but administratively necessary posts are created, a number of the high ones should in practice be reserved for certain nationalities. This does not mean that the major Powers

should monopolize the higher positions, and vigilance should be exercised to see that they do not. It does mean that there should be nationals of all major Powers in the higher directorate, leaving room for only a limited number of nationals of the smaller Powers.

How many of these higher advisory-administrative posts are advisable? Although the exact figure depends on the extent of the work to be done and the number of major Powers whose cooperation is vital, it should be determined with an eye to the nationality of the administrative head and his deputy. There is much to be said in favour of drawing the head of the service from one of the smaller States, but on balance a national from a major Power is desirable at the beginning. The head of the service is more likely to have the valuable initial confidence and helpful understanding of at least one major Government during the important formative years if he himself comes from a large State. Moreover, he accepts a special responsibility of impartiality and international loyalty, and a national of a major Power may, as a general rule, be less exposed to partisan pressure and better able to resist it.

The head of the service will need a deputy, and his freedom of choice should not be hampered in making the appointment. Political considerations cannot be entirely disregarded in such a matter, but if possible their effect should be limited to the enforcement of a wise compromise between the reasons militating in favour of appointing nationals of major or of smaller powers, respectively, to this and other posts in the high directorate. In the first years, there might be some advantage in respect of the authority and self-confidence of the service, if both the top posts were held by nationals of major Powers; but there would be a danger, if this were done, of arousing the mistrust of some of the lesser ones. If found practicable, the best solution in the long run might be that one of the two chief officials should be the national of a major, the other of a smaller Power. In any case, the personal qualities of the men concerned must be the chief consideration.

The demands of major Powers for national representation in the high directorate may have to be met by creating positions similar to the posts of Under-Secretary General in the League Secretariat, the secretariat being so organized that under-secretaries have definite

work to do. These positions need not, indeed should not, be restricted to officials from the major Powers, but the number of smaller States which can be accommodated at this level will depend on how many under-secretaries are really required. In satisfying their Governments' desires for representation they perform a politically important but negative function. One important positive task is advisory, and under-secretaries should be appointed with this in mind, although the head of the service must be vested with full responsibility for final decisions. He should hear the advice and views of his immediate subordinates on important issues, but, in the interests of good administration, he must not be bound by a system of collegiate rule, such as was proposed by those who wished to entrench the position of the major Powers in the League Secretariat.¹

Advisory functions are not enough to keep under-secretaries fully occupied. If, as is much to be desired, it proves possible to appoint only those who have exceptional ability in special fields, they should be given direct administrative responsibility, either as working directors of more or less self-contained sections, such as the legal section, or as supervisors of two or three sections with inter-dependent activities. Experience has shown that they can fulfil a constructive purpose in this manner. This could not be done, however, in the case of an under-secretary appointed only for his ability as a good figurehead; the result would be to impede efficiency and cause dissatisfaction among the staff. Nor would it be fair to section heads, experts in their respective fields, to be under the close supervision of an official who knew comparatively little of the subject. In any case, it is of great importance that nothing in the status or activities of the under-secretaries should be allowed to undermine the position of heads of sections *vis-à-vis* the head of the service. A special burden falls on them, and they ought always to be able to have recourse or appeal to him. This point brings out a matter of cardinal importance in the selection of the high officials: apart from other qualifications, they must be able and willing to work as a team with those above and below them in the service.

In the League Secretariat the existence of Under-Secretaries

¹ Cf. Minority Report, in *Report of the Committee of Thirteen, loc. cit.*, pp. 313-318.

General was a frank compromise between political necessity and administrative efficiency, and a proposal for their abolition was rejected solely because it raised "too many political difficulties."¹ In view of the growing interest in a functional approach to organization, however, posts of a similar character but carrying more responsibility will probably be necessary. In that case, while the question of nationality will by no means lose its importance, special emphasis would no doubt be placed on the technical ability and experience of their prospective holders. It is conceivable that the central secretariat will only co-ordinate the programmes of several autonomous agencies devoted to special tasks. The posts of under-secretary general as known in the past might then disappear, and the directorates of the various agencies taken together might satisfy the need for important positions for nationals of the major Powers, and provide a number of responsible positions to be held by nationals of the smaller Powers. No hard and fast recommendation can be made for such a situation, since it will result from more or less unco-ordinated and, as it were, piecemeal development. The problem must be met on its own merits as it arises.

The qualities which the head of the service should possess are not easy to define. He should be young. Political or diplomatic experience, but not necessarily great fame or eminence, is an advantage. Above all, ability for administration in the broadest sense is important, implying a knowledge of when to be dynamic, to take the initiative and to force an issue; when, at the other extreme, to be content as a purely administrative official; and when, on a middle course, to be a moderator impartially smoothing over difficulties, a catalytic agent in negotiation. (Many of the same considerations will apply to other members of the high directorate.) In a new organization, it may well be that the only qualities which must under all conditions be demanded of the director are those of common sense, courage, integrity and tact.

The central and essential point is that the head of the service and

¹ *Report of the Committee of Thirteen, loc. cit.*, p. 299. The Committee recommended (unsuccessfully) that the posts of Under-Secretary General be made less important by increasing their number to admit more representatives from smaller states and abolishing the distinctions between Under-Secretaries and Directors of sections in everything but title.

his staff must win the confidence of the member States, and of the policy-making organs which they may set up. The various proposals and principles laid down in this and the previous chapter have been formulated with this object in view above all others. But the abilities and personal qualities of the officials are no less important for winning confidence than the existence of a proper framework within which to operate. If able men are not secured, or if the international administration is regarded as a place to pasture incompetent national servants, little advance in world welfare and security will be effected, however carefully the machinery be planned. Perfection of machinery can help substantially, but only if as much care is exercised in selecting the proper people to run the machine as is exercised in creating it; and only if the member Governments on their side regard the secretariat, not as something outside their concern, but as their own servant, to be censured when at fault, but to be supported and protected so long as it does its duty.

NOTE CONCERNING THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE MAIN POLITICAL ORGAN

A proposal has been made that the head of the service should be entrusted with the additional duty of taking the chair at meetings of the main political organ.

While there are clearly advantages, to which we will refer later, to be gained from the appointment of a completely disinterested chairman, we feel that as regards this particular proposal, they are outweighed by the following disadvantages. The assumption of the important duties of chairman would introduce a new factor into the selection of the head of the service, namely considerable experience of public life and parliamentary procedure. The field of choice already limited would thus be further narrowed. We have already expressed the opinion that the head of the service should be comparatively young in years. If this view is accepted, he would be called upon to preside over meetings, composed for the most part of persons considerably older than himself, and of the highest rank in national politics.

The necessity of the presence of a head of the service in his capacity as chairman during all the sessions of the political organ might well interfere with other activities, which he should be performing in his capacity of head of the service. Lastly, the fact that the officer was not only head of the service but also chairman of the

political organ might lead public opinion to identify over-much the international organization with a given personality.

These objections would not of course apply to the appointment of a permanent chairman who was not the head of the service. Theoretically there is much to be said in favour of such a scheme. If the proper chairman is found, he will not be swayed by political considerations. He need not consider the relations between his own Government and the Governments represented round the table.

There are however two conditions requisite for success. One concerns the chairman's personal qualifications. He must be widely respected in his own right and have a certain international standing; and he must of course be free from any responsibility to, or dependence on, the Government of his own country. He should have experience of diplomatic affairs, be accustomed to taking the chair, and be free from violent prejudices.

The second condition, which is particularly germane to this report, is that the delimitation of the duties of such a chairman and of those of the head of the service must be clear. The chairman should consult with the head of the service before the meetings in order to become familiar with the problems on the agenda, but he ought not to be in a position to take separate action. Otherwise a conflict of jurisdictions, if nothing more, would be likely to arise between the chairman and the head of the service. Indeed this point might constitute in any case a serious danger.

However this may be, it is clear that it is likely to be difficult to find such a chairman and though it may hardly fall within the avowed scope of this report, we feel that it would not be improper to record our view that the practice followed in respect of the Presidency of the Sessions of the Council of the League of Nations worked, on the whole, well. The chairman for each regular Session was chosen by rotation from among the members of the Council, though if the country of which he was a delegate was specially interested in any particular problem on the agenda, a disinterested delegate took his place as chairman during the discussion of that particular item.

VI. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Still considering the broad question of how best to ensure the requisite combination of efficiency in the secretariat and confidence on the part of member States, we turn from internal organization to

external relations. These have two major aspects, each of which may be sub-divided: the part played directly by the secretariat itself through the liaison activities of its officials and through the work of its information section; and the part played by Governments through permanent delegations at the seat of the organization and through domestic machinery for dealing with the organization.

LIAISON ACTIVITIES OF SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS

Close liaison with the outside forces on which the satisfactory working of a secretariat depends is obviously essential. It is of the utmost value to the service and indispensable for efficient operation and mutual understanding. Liaison should be an integral function of the service itself, supplementing contacts maintained through national delegates, whose position will be considered later. When the head of the service or another high official calls for a report on political developments or the state of opinion in a particular country, or needs to make contact with its competent authorities in order to discuss some question affecting his work, it is most desirable that he should be able to do this through a person who has an obligation of loyalty to the secretariat—in other words through a member of its staff, and, in most cases, a member who is also a national of the country concerned. A description of liaison functions will show why this is so.

A liaison agent must be in a position to report accurately on currents of opinion in his country, and to describe the attitude of his Government. Secondly, it is his duty to discuss concrete questions with the appropriate authorities of his Government at the request and on behalf of the head of the service, but not to discuss concrete questions with the latter at the request and on behalf of his Government. He should, of course, explain his Government's policies, but he should do so without attempting to further them. To make this distinction is not always easy. It is a test both of international loyalty and of objectivity towards national interests and viewpoints, the more so since Governments may not always refrain, as they ought to do, from taking advantage of the presence of one of their nationals in the service by pressing him to assist in the work of national delegations. Another duty of a liaison agent is to

give to his compatriots the fullest explanation possible of the work of the international body, especially in connection with decisions which may be unpopular in the country in question.

The internal organization of liaison activities must be settled largely by trial and error. This is particularly true of the selection of officials for such work. It goes without saying that they must command the full confidence of the head of the service and the respect of their Governments, but not all officials, however trustworthy, are able to undertake successfully the tasks described above.

At first sight it might seem desirable to constitute a special section of liaison agents. Experience however shows that the best results are achieved by not standardizing these activities. Contacts with individual countries do not, in the great majority of cases, demand the attention of a full-time official, and a special corps of liaison agents would involve all the difficulties described in an earlier chapter as resulting from the existence of officials without definite full-time duties. Moreover, even in the few cases where an official could be occupied fully with liaison work, the variety of problems for discussion would be so great that the head of the service would often prefer to use a person with special knowledge of a particular type of question. Another important point is that liaison work, so far as it involves travelling, should be spread among the staff as widely as possible, because this helps to keep the officials in personal touch with conditions away from the centre.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that, subject to the principle that adequate liaison must be established and maintained with every member country, each official should be appointed for some specified function, *plus* liaison to be performed when called upon. Undoubtedly, some will prove to be more gifted than others for work of this kind, and will have correspondingly more of it to do. Liaison work often requires special missions. On the other hand, it can often be done during periods of leave; but it should not on that account be regarded as an extra or a sideline of secondary importance.

To sum up, the essential nature of liaison functions is that they are performed for and on behalf of the head of the service. They should be carried out as complementary to, but not less important

tion experts and professional lecturers. Dealing with these various sub-divisions, one after the other, the following might briefly be said to be their respective tasks:

NEWS DEPARTMENT

This department would make available to the world press all matters of news value produced by various branches of the organization. It is, however, a matter for discussion whether the almost exclusive official method—communiqués, verbatim records, official documents, and so on—should be repeated. In certain circumstances, the publication of communiqués and other official documents will still be desirable, but experience has taught that often it tends to discourage instructive and comprehensive publicity, which can be better obtained by giving this department a freer hand in handling documents for their news value. It might be advisable, therefore, to give a new information section a less official position in the secretariat, with more character of a semi-official body.

The transmission of news should also be handled in a different way. The Information Section of the League, after having made the news available to the press, left the selection for distribution entirely to the press. As it happened, the principal newspapers of the world and the leading press agencies each had its own correspondent in Geneva, and under the pressure of competition the news was generally handled in such a way as to over-emphasize purely political events and to relegate the often not less important but more technical news to the background.

It would be worth while to suggest to the leading press agencies of the world the desirability of establishing, at their own cost, at the seat of the organization, a joint office, or perhaps even a collective agency for the purpose of handling routine news. By thus pooling journalistic talent and by staffing this agency with people specialized in international affairs, it would be possible to reduce the cost of service and to obtain a more balanced presentation, without endangering the all-important freedom of the press. This would require, of course, close co-operation between the news department and the joint office or agency. Thus, newspapers and individual agencies would find it an advantage to leave the handling of routine news mainly to the joint agency, and concentrate themselves on first-class news and on personal comments and descriptive articles whenever they feel it worth while.

PUBLICATIONS DEPARTMENT

Equal in importance should be the publications department, composed of specialized writers whose task would be to produce books, pamphlets and magazine articles. Experience gained by various national information offices during the war shows that, while official reports have only a limited circulation, there are considerable opportunities of reaching a much larger public by publishing the same material in a more attractive and popular form. In this connection special attention should be given to technical subjects, the importance of which can hardly be

brought home to the general public if the information section is not allowed to rewrite official reports.

RADIO DEPARTMENT

It is difficult to imagine an international organization without a radio station of its own. It should not be equipped with short-wave apparatus only, as was the League station, but also with medium- and long-wave transmitters which can cover areas near the transmission point. Moreover, the station should not be shared by a national government or company, but should be owned and operated exclusively by the organization. Apart from official, point-to-point communications, the station should also be equipped for general broadcasting purposes to a far greater extent than was Radio Nations. A special radio division of the information section should provide talks and lectures and present them as much as possible, not in official jargon but in free and easy radiophonic style. Co-operation with the various national broadcasting organizations could make the station a real forum for the discussion of international problems, for a relay for speeches by important statesmen, and for the international exchange of cultural programmes. The station should also broadcast regular news bulletins, but this part of the programme should be handled by the collective news agency previously mentioned, and not by the information section. Post-war wave lengths agreements should take into account the special requirements of this station.

FILM DEPARTMENT

The danger of any official or semi-official film department frequently is a tendency to compete with the private film industry. This should be avoided, especially with regard to expensive feature programme films, and the film department should specialize in two forms of activities: news reels and documentaries. The unit should, moreover, co-operate as much as possible with private firms which produce these two types of films. Documentation should be devoted particularly to non-political activities of the organization. They should not be released only for theatrical distribution, but also for use in schools and meetings and for the illustration of lectures. The unit should not limit its activities to events at the seat of the organization. On the contrary, a cameraman should accompany all important missions and attend all meetings abroad. Distribution for the general public should remain entirely in private hands.

PICTURE DEPARTMENT

This department should have various duties. It should provide illustrations for articles, pamphlets and books of the publications department and photographic material for the press, material for exhibitions and pictorial publicity of different types, such as posters, lantern slides, etc.

EXHIBITION AND LECTURING DEPARTMENT

The experience of the League Pavilion at the New York World's Fair showed that, with expert assistance and freedom of expression, international organizations and their work can lend themselves to a most fas-

ready, as a rule, to accept the decision of the majority, so that the budget met with little opposition when it came before the full Assembly, and such opposition was not carried to the extent of a dissenting vote. We venture no recommendations on this subject because it impinges on the whole problem of unanimity, which is essentially a political one.

Finally, we would emphasize how important it is that, whether by the provision of adequate reserves, or by other methods, the head of the administration should actually receive 100 per cent of the funds voted for a given year. Failure to achieve this object, in addition to the restrictive effect on the work of the organization, will tend to upset the balance between the functions of the administrative head and the treasurer. The treasurer, naturally concerned to avoid a deficit, will be forced to question the necessity of carrying out in full the various authorized objects of expenditure. The head of the service should of course ultimately determine the choice to be made but nevertheless a danger may arise that in times of financial stress the treasurer may be driven through the force of circumstances to take in fact, if not in form, decisions affecting matters of general policy.

The reader may be surprised that we have devoted so much space to the financial aspects of the future international organization. Experience has shown, however, that attitudes and decisions in this field have a greater influence on the working of the organization as a whole than could have been anticipated, or than the relatively modest sums involved might appear to warrant.

CONCLUSIONS

We have tried, on the basis of experience, to anticipate, and to recommend solutions for, the main problems which are likely to confront the organizers and administrators of the secretariat of any new international organization which conforms generally to the assumptions set out in Chapter II, viz: that the concept of state sovereignty will continue; that the organization will be world-wide; that it will deal both with security and political problems and with welfare problems; and that even if several more or less autonomous

agencies are created, they will of necessity be co-ordinated by some sort of central organization, even if this co-ordination should at first be only on the financial plane.

Good administration can make an essential contribution to the success of the new organization. It will, for example, help to create an atmosphere which is conducive to the loyalty of international officials; it will attract able persons to service in the secretariat, ensure the maintenance of good working relations with the national civil services, and reduce considerably the difficulties of collecting members' contribution quotas. But it must never be forgotten that the guarantee of success lies ultimately in the hands of the peoples—of individual men and women exercising through constitutional processes their will ungrudgingly to use and support the organization. It will be of vital importance to have the best possible machinery; but the quality of the machinery does not and cannot offer an adequate substitute for the will to use it.

APPENDIX

SUGGESTIONS BY A. PELT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A SECRETARIAT INFORMATION SECTION

The Information Section of the League Secretariat, as organized in the years 1919 and 1920, corresponded to the then existing state of public opinion in the world and to the technical development of the world press. The newspapers and the news agencies were the principal instruments for the collection, transmission and distribution of news and for the expression of public opinion. The film was still in its infancy as a medium of visual news, and it had hardly begun to play a part as documentary evidence of current events. The radio was still a technical toy in the hands of amateurs. The picture press, although highly developed as an illustrator of events, was not yet considered an equal partner to the newspapers.

It was therefore natural that the Information Section should consist mainly of publicists and journalists, although it contained, perhaps, too many political writers and not enough specialists capable of producing books, pamphlets and magazine articles on various League activities, particularly those of a technical nature.

After twenty years of experience, during the course of which the various means of presenting information have undergone a tremendous development, an information section would have to be conceived accordingly. It would be insufficient to start again with a staff consisting mainly of political journalists. This type of journalist will be indispensable, but also, and on the same level of importance, the section should contain radio commentators, film experts, press photographers, exhibi-

a sum equal to its quota for the year. In the absence of such a bank, each member might deposit with the secretariat, when it joins the organization, a sum equal to, say, estimated contributions for two years, to be drawn upon should it fall behind in its quota payments.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

The following paragraphs describe certain special problems which did occur in League experience and are likely to occur in connection with the budget of any international organization.

The League budget was voted at the beginning of October, its fiscal year beginning in the following January. To make this possible, the Secretary General's estimates had to be laid before the Supervisory Commission in time to be considered by it and dispatched to all members early in June, otherwise the more distant members would not have had time to submit them to the salutary process of examination by the competent officials and by the legislature, before giving the necessary instructions to their delegations. In these circumstances, Section heads were required to draw up their estimates for the following fiscal year at least nine months in advance; such estimates could in some cases only be based on guess-work, and in most cases could hardly be exact. Air communications after the war will undoubtedly lessen this difficulty by saving, in the case of distant members, at least two months of the time previously required. It may also be possible to reduce the interval between the final adoption of the budget and the fiscal year to which it applies. But in any case the budget estimates of the international organization will have to be drawn up more in advance of the fiscal year than in the case of national budgets, and than is convenient for close budgeting.

A further problem is that of providing for requirements which cannot be foreseen in advance. The financial regulations of the League did not permit inclusion in the estimates of unallocated sums which could be used at the discretion of competent officials to meet emergencies. The budget must of course be so drawn up as to assure the members that they know and approve in advance the expenditures to which they contribute; but it is essential to provide a

margin for unforeseen events, since it is unlikely that the international organization can discover any practicable method of securing supplementary votes—the expedient to which national treasuries resort in parallel circumstances. One device (which however runs contrary to the orthodox theory of budgetary control) is to rob Peter to pay Paul by transferring funds available under one approved heading to meet emergencies under another. The better plan is to provide special appropriations in the budget to cover unforeseen needs. Whether this is done by allotting a lump sum, by adding a fixed percentage to the approved budget of each section or agency, or by authorizing the head of the service to borrow within fixed limits, is not important from the point of view of the service. What is important is that the service should be able to meet emergencies without having to provide for them by the unsatisfactory and probably inadequate expedient of over-estimating known requirements. Governments of member States will probably demand more control for such expenditures than is provided by a post-audit. This can be secured by stipulating that approval must be obtained from a body similar to the Supervisory Commission of the League of Nations for extraordinary administrative expenditures or a body similar to the Council for expenditures arising from political emergencies.

Another special problem is the possible effect of a minority vote when the budget is finally adopted. Under the unanimity rule of the Covenant a single adverse vote might have been interpreted as destroying the legal basis on which members could be asked to pay their contributions for the ensuing year. This problem could be dealt with by providing that the budget of the future organization could be legally adopted by a vote which was less than unanimous, e.g. a vote of the majority of the members present provided that the units of contribution payable by the assenting members amounted to more than half the total. Alternatively, there could be a gentleman's agreement among the members to consider themselves bound to pay their contributions in spite of the legal effect of an adverse vote. It should be noted that in the Budget Committee of the Assembly there were keen debates on the estimates, which were often pressed to a vote. The minority, however, showed themselves

tion.¹ It was very unfair that, for example, it should cost Argentina hundreds of pounds to send one delegate, and England and France only a few pounds. The same thing arose over communications: it cost delegations from distant countries large sums to communicate with their Foreign Offices, whereas those from Paris, Berlin or London could do so at very little cost. Redistribution was called for both by equity and because it would have strengthened the understanding of the League in all countries.

These considerations bring into the open two principles which in our view should be fully and frankly recognized in any new association of nations. First, the ruling organs should actively promote and facilitate the co-operation of all the members. Secondly, the accidents of geography which impose on some members a great relative disadvantage should as far as possible be compensated.

Another way in which budgetary restriction led to inequities was through the limitations it imposed on the size of the Secretariat. Apart from the fact that certain activities were hampered by insufficiency of staff, many members had no nationals in its ranks. In 1932, out of a total membership of fifty-five States, seventeen had no nationals among the higher officials. Fourteen States had only one. Had a spirit of liberality prevailed, much wider representation could have been achieved, without contravening the principles laid down in Chapter IV concerning the problem of maximum efficiency and maximum representation. As it was, the appointment of even one additional higher official became a major budgetary consideration.

The conclusion is that the value to its members of any future international organization will depend to an appreciable degree on the attitude which they adopt in regard to its budgetary problems. It is not a question of parsimony or extravagance. It is a question of restrictive economy which hampers action, or wise economy which pre-

¹ First-class travel for three delegates from each state member to Geneva would have meant an additional budget item of a little more than 400,000 Swiss francs (\$80,000, £16,000, before Switzerland abandoned the gold standard) or about 2 per cent of the total League budget in 1931. Delegates to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, members of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and members of most of the League's permanent and temporary technical committees and commissions (not to be confused with Assembly committees mentioned above) received their expenses from the League. Nevertheless, proposals for redistributing the cost of attendance at Assembly meetings in this more equitable manner were discouraged year after year because its application would have involved an apparent increase in the total cost of the League.

vents waste but encourages full activity, vitality and initiative. The members of the League erred on the side of the former alternative and to a perceptible, although unmeasurable, degree, helped to cripple their servant. Public opinion should be prepared for substantial expenditure. Forewarned against crippling demands for economy whether from hidden foes or from over-careful friends, it will not grudge financial support to an organization which it believes may help to stimulate welfare and maintain peace, and whose failure would be the signal for opening once more the real flood-gates of expenditure.

ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES

We now turn to the questions involved in the actual payment of contributions by the member States. These are of course the same, whether budget policy be expansive or restrictive. From the point of view of the international secretariat, they have two main aspects: (i) the allocation of expenses and (ii) the collection of quotas.

To draw up and apply a satisfactory schedule for the allocation of expenses between a large number of States, is no easy task. At Geneva it occupied many hours of discussion both among experts and among delegates. The amounts involved were often very small; but this hardly affected the difficulty, or indeed the importance, of the problem, since it involved principles of equity. Governments naturally compared their quotas with those of other members of similar economic position. Occasionally political rather than financial arguments were involved. In any case, any Government which felt it had a case for reduction, was persistent in pressing its claims.

Article 6 of the Covenant originally provided that the "expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union." This was at once found to be a completely unsatisfactory basis; and the need for reform was so evident that a new formula, based on "capacity to pay" was applied by consent even before it was possible to put through the amendment to the Covenant required to make it legally watertight.

Capacity to pay was determined primarily by national Govern-

of the final estimates. Incidentally, when, as often happened, delegations at Geneva were too small to allow representation on all Assembly Committees, the Budget Committee, by tradition dedicated to severity, had first claim. The unhappy effect of over-economy in itself provided further reasons for this attitude, and a vicious circle was thus completed: restrictive budget, ineffective League; ineffective League, restrictive budget.

Relatively small increases in the budget would have enhanced the value of the League's services and strengthened its position. The technical and social organs could always have made good use of additional appropriations. A notable example of missed opportunity was the Assembly's failure to pay the travelling expenses of delegates. European countries regularly sent large delegations, frequently numbering thirty or forty delegates, substitute delegates, and experts; whereas the delegations of distant members were usually not only few in number, but consisted for the most part, not of persons who played a part in national politics, but of diplomats posted in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome or Berne, and of permanent delegates to the League. This disparity was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Governments had to pay the cost of sending delegates. Partly, of course, it was due to indifference; and here again we find a vicious circle of the same type as described in the last paragraph—indifference resulting from lack of contact, lack of contact resulting from indifference—which it is of the highest importance to break. The fact that expenses of delegates to Inter-American Conferences are paid by their respective Governments is no analogy, because these Conferences move from one capital to another, equalizing in the long run not only the expenses involved but also opportunities for close contact.

The Assembly did most of its work, and took most of its decisions, in its six main committees, on which every delegation was entitled to sit. If a delegation was small and had few or no technical experts, or if its members were appointed merely because of propinquity to Geneva at the time of meeting, it could take little part in the work of these committees. In such cases it is no great wonder if both Government and people began to lose their sense of real membership and of a vital interest in the working of the League—a consequence

which might have been averted by making it as easy as possible for all members to be fully represented.

Again, the financial rules of the League laid upon host Governments the extra expenses of holding conferences or other meetings, including those of the Council, elsewhere than in Geneva. This discouraged invitations for such meetings which, otherwise, would have been frequent and which, when they did occur, proved of value to all concerned. In the early years of the League, peripatetic activity was much more frequent than later; and budgetary restriction was the principal reason why it was abandoned.¹ When the work of international co-operation is resumed, the international organization must move about and be seen.

This correlation between broad contact with the international organization, on the one hand, and continued interest in its work, on the other, is of vital importance. A qualified observer who was in Geneva from the beginning of the League until 1940 has laid stress on this point, as well as on the concomitant inequity of unpaid expenses for delegates:

If all the non-European countries had known that the travelling expenses of three delegates² would be paid, there would have been no lack of persons applying for the position, and the fact of being appointed would have indicated that the delegate was not without influence at home. Thus we should have had every year three people coming from each country and going back to it, instead of diplomats from Paris or London who rarely went home, and whose coming to the Assembly did little to strengthen the position of the League in their own countries. Experience shows that when a man did come and serve on the Assembly once or twice, he could, in most cases, be relied on, when he got back to his own country, to be a friend and supporter of the League. As years went by, there would have grown up in every capital a group of former delegates, and during the years of crisis of the League, the weight of their opinion might have been very important. Of course, this would not really be an addition to the cost of membership of the League as a whole, but simply a redistribu-

¹ Cf. Resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1922, recommending that, "in view of the necessity of realizing economies . . . the Council should always hold its sessions at Geneva, except in the case of absolutely exceptional circumstances. . . ." *Records of the Third Assembly*, Plenary Meetings, I, p. 373.

² The Covenant provides for three official representatives.

ing to the main permanent committees of the League, and consisted of about ten or twelve officials besides secretarial and stenographic staff. Its director held the rank of minister plenipotentiary in the diplomatic service.

BRANCH OFFICES

An aspect of external relations not mentioned so far is the part played by branch offices. Their functions will probably be more important than in the past, but it is impossible to forecast them in detail, since their position will be governed by the basic structure of the organization as a whole. If a comprehensive central organization, similar to the League, is created, branch offices should be used to assist in information work, to arrange regional conferences if necessary, and to perform similar administrative functions; but it would not, as a rule, be desirable to employ them for liaison work. They should be staffed only partly by local people, and there should be interchange of personnel between them and the centre so as to maintain close association. If however the new system is more regional in its structure than was the League, or if its organization is based on several more or less autonomous functional bodies with widely separated seats, branch offices will assume a position for which there is no comparable experience on which to found recommendations.

VII. LANGUAGES

Nothing in the way of international practice is more difficult to change, once it is established, than the use of selected languages as "official." In the League the official languages were English and French. In Assembly, Council and Committee every statement made in French was, with only occasional exceptions, forthwith interpreted into English by one of the League's interpreters, and *vice versa*. All documents were issued simultaneously in both languages. Any delegate making a speech in a language other than French or English, which he was always entitled to do, had himself to provide for its interpretation into one of the two official lan-

guages, a League interpreter then giving the rendering into the other.

Obviously, order and regularity in the conduct of international business require that every international organization adopt a clear rule, not too easily changed, in the matter of the language or languages to be officially employed. The first question is whether two are necessary. The use of two languages is in many ways a drag on efficiency. It prolongs the duration of meetings. It delays the issue of documents, especially when, as in the League, they must be equally valid texts, compared together and issued simultaneously. And it is a considerable additional expense.

It is often urged that a single language be selected as the recognized vehicle of international discussion. It may be that after a long period of time one language will assert itself as unmistakably the world language, but as things are, neither English nor French nor any other language can by itself provide the means by which all delegates to an international conference may understand one another. It is therefore incumbent upon an international organization to offer to delegates at its own charge a choice between at least two languages. Moreover, though the use of two languages delays the proceedings, there are compensations even from the point of view of efficiency.

The tempo of an international meeting can never be as rapid as when all have a perfect understanding of the language used. Many a delegate catches up during the interpretation on a point which he missed in the original speech—for a large number of delegates know something of both languages but not quite enough of either. Moreover, while the cool impersonal voice of the interpreter increases the tedium of a lifeless debate, it softens those dialectical asperities which in international affairs are even more dangerous than they are delightful. More important still, the use of two languages is a constant reminder of the obstinate diversity, as between different peoples, not only of the words which they speak but of their underlying assumptions and habits of thought, the impatient forgetfulness of which brings so many good international intentions to grief.

It would obviously be desirable, on general grounds, if the organization could offer a wide choice of official languages. Of

time build up a group of competent persons who can usually be relied upon to support the organization in their own countries. They assure the presence of at least some one of a certain importance to represent the country when special delegates are unable to be present. Finally, permanent delegations, familiar with procedure at the centre, can give valuable assistance to other representatives when they attend meetings of the political organ or of standing and special committees.

If permanent delegations are maintained, the international service must organize its relations with them on a systematic basis. A member of the high directorate should be specially charged with the duty of assisting them and of facilitating their contacts with officials. Given a large number of permanent delegates and many more seasonal and special representatives, there will be some danger lest controversial questions may be discussed between them and junior members of the service. To guard against this, the necessary protocol should be developed, and a list of responsible officials who are available for the discussion of such questions should be prepared for the use of delegates. It should, however be the responsibility of members of the staff, not of the delegates, to avoid unauthorized discussions.

NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR HANDLING RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

National machinery for dealing with the central organization is obviously the exclusive concern of member Governments, but it is not their exclusive interest. It is responsible for one end of a two-way traffic and affects the smoothness of operations at the centre. Its form will vary in each case according to the type of national Government, and will depend largely on the intensity of relations with the central organization. The best forms, however, will have certain common characteristics. They will reflect a recognition that Foreign Offices should not try to monopolize relations with the centre, though they must be fully informed concerning all such relations and be prepared to co-ordinate them as required. The problems which arise touch the national life at so many different points that almost all ministries are interested in some phase of these rela-

tions. It would be wise to create within the Foreign Offices special departments whose duty it is to be familiar with all activities of the international body. These departments should enjoy a degree of autonomy which permits direct dealings with interested departments of other Ministries and initiative in co-ordinating all aspects of official relations with the central organization. Forming part of the Foreign Office, they will be able to make the Minister of Foreign Affairs aware of any factors which may concern foreign policy; but their primary function should be to make certain that the proper branches of the Government are kept informed and consulted in each case, and that delegates and representatives on technical committees are properly instructed. A recognized, semi-autonomous office of this nature is also of great assistance to visiting officials from the international service.

The most satisfactory arrangement for dealing with League affairs was probably that evolved by the French. The "Service français de la Société des Nations" was a major division of the Quai d'Orsay, ranking with the geographical divisions. It was primarily an administrative office for correlating the views of the various ministries and technical departments, receiving official communications from the League, including the Permanent Court and the International Labour Office, and drafting outgoing communications. The head of the *Service*, however, was frequently in a position to act in an advisory capacity on political matters by virtue of his experience of, and close contact with, all League affairs. The success of the *Service* depended largely on his ability to work well with other interested departments and to secure the co-operation of technical experts who attended League committees and conferences.

Delegates to conferences and members of committees reported to the *Service* before leaving Paris and on returning. They were in constant contact with it while in Geneva, and its representatives often accompanied them as advisers. French members of the Council and the Assembly were also in close contact with the *Service*, whose head usually attended meetings of the Assembly as an assistant delegate and as secretary-general of the delegation.

The "Service français" was larger than other national offices for League affairs. It was organized internally into sections, correspond-

possible and never treated as a necessary evil, it must be remembered that publicity excesses, which turn open diplomacy into market diplomacy, can do as much harm as excessive secrecy, which arouses suspicions and alienates a source of valuable support.

The public must know the fundamental issues at stake, and journalists should receive preparatory documentation on each case. The press must not be made to feel that it is admitted only to witness a *fait accompli*. Nevertheless, it is sometimes necessary to draw the curtain after the preliminary, plenary sessions, when discussion of aims and principles gives way to negotiation of detail. This enables delegates to indulge in the non-committal process of thinking aloud, and may often facilitate the reaching of an agreement. At this stage, however, the success of a meeting may be endangered by the delegates themselves, who may be tempted to offer to journalists, particularly to those from their own country, their own versions of the proceedings, and to vie with each other for press support of their respective programmes. To minimize impolitic leakages, therefore, while giving all information which can properly be made public, an agreed communiqué should be prepared at the close of each private meeting and released immediately at a press conference at which the chairman or secretary is available for explanations and off-the-record remarks. The success of such a policy depends not only on the co-operation of the press but also on that of delegates, e.g. by making a practice of holding international rather than national press conferences. The press, on its side, should be prepared to exercise self-discipline, and its willingness to do so will be in direct proportion to the facilities it enjoys in carrying out its legitimate functions.

Another duty of an information section might be in connection with any international press, radio and analogous agreements. It seems possible that, without in any way violating the all-important principle of the freedom of the press, some unofficial agreements might be reached among those concerned to ensure that their great influence should be employed on the side of international understanding, and to mitigate that unrestrained violence of controversy which has made the maintenance of such understanding unnecessarily difficult in the past. The information section might be called upon to provide, or assist, the secretariat of any bureau or commis-

sion set up by such agreements, which might be regional, or universal, or both.

PERMANENT NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

A very large number of Governments maintained permanent delegations in Geneva. They were variously organized, some having relatively large staffs, others having only one or two officers, still others comprising a single diplomatic or consular representative who devoted only a part of his time to League affairs. However organized, the maintenance of permanent delegations is on balance a desirable practice in spite of certain possible disadvantages.

There may be an inclination on the part of some Governments to use their permanent delegates to represent them at important meetings of the political organ instead of sending key figures, such as their Foreign Ministers. The danger of secondary representation because of the existence of permanent delegations should not, however, prove very serious. Experience shows that the great majority of Governments, in deciding whether or not to send special delegations, will be guided (a) by their desire to play a creditable part in the general activities of international life and (b) by their interest in the problems for discussion, not by the fact that they have or have not a permanent delegation at the centre.

A more serious danger is the tendency to use permanent delegates as Jacks-of-all-trades to sit on numerous technical committees about whose work they know practically nothing, nationality being their only qualification. In Geneva this practice satisfied an understandable desire for at least nominal participation, but it was a barrier to effective and informed participation. This danger, like that mentioned above, will be reduced by air transport. But in many borderline cases the expense of sending special delegations may continue as in the past to be a deciding factor. This point will be considered in the last chapter.

Despite the potential misuse of permanent delegations, there are advantages which make it advisable to encourage their maintenance by all members. They provide a constant and mutually beneficial contact at the centre between Governments and the organization. Even as between member States, they may establish relations which supplement those of ordinary diplomacy. They may in the course of

than, his regular work by whomever the head of the service selects. The latter should not be limited in his choice either to the senior official, or to any particular official, from the country concerned; nor should he hesitate to employ a national of another country where this may seem to him appropriate.

INFORMATION SECTION¹ AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

Understanding and support by world public opinion is no less necessary to the success of the organization than is the co-operation of member Governments. In the future this will be as true for technical as for political questions. Nutrition schemes, for example, will need popular support in both producing and consuming areas. Those responsible for the publicity of the organization must undertake their task with a clear understanding of the fact that the purpose of publicity in a democratic community is to supply the public with such knowledge of relevant facts and conditions as will enable it ultimately to control events. This will be as necessary in the international as in the national sphere.

An information section, therefore, should not only serve the press, but also utilize all the other modern techniques of public instruction. It must seek to render interesting the undramatic as well as the dramatic aspects of international life. It must cater to the most varied public—the farmer in Nebraska, the shopkeeper in Lyons, the tractor-driver in a Soviet rural community. How this can best be done will vary from case to case, but it must be done in a manner which is attractive and easily understandable to each group of readers, listeners or motion picture audiences.

The section should assist the regular news services and provide ample opportunity for reporters and editors to get both spot news and routine news. At the same time, it should carefully avoid creating the impression that press releases when used are official gospel. It is important that facts should be available in a handy form for journalists to use as they wish.

A further function is to issue information, as distinct from news, through the great variety of media which are available. Apart from

¹ A note containing more detailed suggestions for a secretariat information section appears as an appendix.

provision of official records and documentary material for the specialist there is much more scope for initiative in reaching the public to-day than when the information section of the League was set up. This is particularly the case in the field of visual education by means of films and exhibitions, which can be used to supplement pamphlets, lectures, and radio broadcasts.

In all the activities of the section, special care must be taken not to incur the charge of propagandizing in the odious sense of the term. Praise should be left to Governments and to people unconnected with the service. The line between propaganda and straightforward description is difficult to draw, particularly so for an international service, because an international organization, unlike a national Government, has no direct facilities for replying to criticism in periods when the political organ is not in session. The burden falls naturally on the service, which must, for example, explain the reasons for a hard-fought decision so impartially as not to prejudice the position of those who opposed it and may hope some time to reverse it. At this point straight news releases and descriptive publication must give way to explanation by responsible officials; and the latter must always bear in mind that suspicion of partisanship can quickly damage goodwill and understanding which it has taken a long time to build up.

To produce the best results, the section should be as independent as possible of "official" direction, within the obvious limits of accuracy and of loyalty to the basic principles and policy of the organization. At the same time it must work closely with each of the other sections in order to maintain a satisfactory link between them and the public. It is also advisable that the staff of the section should not be kept overlong at the centre, and that fresh workers should be brought in periodically to ensure a constant familiarity with trends and feelings in the various countries. Finally, although political journalists will necessarily constitute part of the staff, full use should be made of people with first-hand experience in education, photography, films, broadcasting, and in the study of public opinion.

Press facilities at special meetings and conferences are of particular importance. Although the press should be assisted as much as

cinating exhibition, but that no exhibition, whether fixed or of the smaller travelling type, produces its full value unless visitors are entertained by lectures and films. This does not mean that exhibitions and lectures are inseparable; on the contrary, on many occasions it will be useful to send lecturers on tours without exhibition material. On other occasions, lecturers will find it useful to have films or slides at their disposal. In any case, an information section should have a sub-division of lecturers and exhibition experts co-operating closely with, and supported by, the film and picture departments.

To be successful, a modern information section should have, as already pointed out, a less official and formal character than did the League Information Section. Not only would it require a more varied staff, but many of its staff should not be permanent. Most of the members of the League Information Section, several of whom remained in the service for more than ten or twelve years, finished by losing touch with the world of publicity. In the future, therefore, a proportion of the staff should be recruited for short periods of not longer than from three to five years on the basis, when possible, of exchange arrangements with newspapers, press agencies and broadcasting organizations.

The most desirable relationship between the information section and the rest of the secretariat is not easy to define. Much will depend on the freedom which high officials of the organization will be prepared to grant to such a section. If each word written by the information section be considered as official, the new section, even when ideally organized, will never become a live organism. If, on the other hand, it be recognized that active publicity can only be successfully handled by men enjoying freedom of expression, an information section may become one of the most potent instruments to maintain contact between the organization and world public opinion. Naturally, this requires that the staff exercise a high sense of professional responsibility.

Finally, an essential condition of success is to avoid everything which could give the information section the appearance of a propaganda institute in disguise. After the last war the foundation of the League was to such an extent revolutionary that the new institution required active propaganda, although even at that time the use of the word propaganda was realized to be a drawback. If after the present war world public opinion is prepared to make a fresh start, it may be hoped that the international organization will be considered as an accepted fact, which, instead of having to be defended by means of propaganda, will simply require presentation to the public in an informative and explanatory way.

Present signs indicate that, at least in all free countries, the public will be definitely anti-propaganda minded. Therefore, an information section must carefully avoid adopting "propaganda" methods, and its output, whether in the form of news articles, films, broadcasts, or exhibitions, should consist of unvarnished information and explanation. An information section thus conceived and conducted will have much more chance to gain the confidence of the public than if it is considered, as was frequently the case in the past, as a body of people to explain away the organization's failures and to boost its successes.