

LORD HARROWBY'S MOTION ON POLAND.

For Friday, July 19, 1861.

Considerations submitted by the Deputation from the Foreign Affairs Committees.

THE case of Poland has to be regarded as that of Europe.

It is only by a knowledge of the means through which the Powers of Europe have to be induced to submit to the incorporation of Poland with Russia that any separate European and Asiatic transaction can be understood.

The English Government appears to have taken an active and systematic part in paralyzing the several endeavours and resisting the concerted action of the various Powers of Europe, when, on various occasions, it was the desire of those Powers to protect or to restore Polish liberty.

All the negotiations upon this subject have been systematically withheld from the knowledge of the Parliament.

The effect of this ignorance has been to produce conclusions in the public mind exactly the reverse of the truth, alike in regard to the dispositions of France, of Austria, and of Prussia, to which Governments have been attributed, at different times, that opposition to the restoration of Poland, which it now appears has been the course pursued by the British Government alone.

The consequence of this suppression of the truth has been a false supposition of an accumulation of great power in the hands of Russia, by means of those alliances to keep down Poland.

The restoration of Poland appears still to continue to be a primary object with the Governments of Austria, of Prussia, and of the Ottoman Empire, so that a concert for this purpose, if sanctioned by England, must immediately obtain a successful accomplishment.

It is well known that the Russian Government, by its superior diplomatic intelligence and activity, has invariably succeeded in causing the other Governments of Europe to act according to her suggestions, and that it is principally through the Government of England that she has obtained the acceptance of those suggestions.*

It is in furtherance of the same objects, sought in the suppression of Poland, that she is at present operating against Austria, Prussia, Turkey, and Denmark, and preparing convulsions for Italy and Germany.

Whilst operating through the Governments by their acceptance of her suggestions, she is simultaneously operating through the revolutionary element, which she directs through her agents, continuing, nevertheless, to be accepted by those who fear revolution, as the anti-revolutionary power on which they have to rely.

It is thus that out of the sacrifice of Poland that state of convulsion has been attained in Europe, the further progress and ultimate consummation of which can be prevented only by a decision of the Powers of Europe to return to the original stand taken by them at the first Treaty of Vienna, when they decided that the creation of a Poland independent of Russia was necessary for the

safety of Europe and for its protection, alike against the hostile menace of her armies, then supposed to be powerful, and against her revolutionary operations, the nature and effects of which were then fully apprehended.

The Historian of the Ottoman Empire, M. Von Hammer, terminates that History at the first partition of Poland, on the grounds that, by that event, Russia had so embroiled the affairs of the world, that no country of Europe could be said to have an independent history, and the secret of all events lay concealed in the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

On these grounds it is submitted, that the first step in reference to Poland must be to obtain a knowledge of the secret communications between the Governments of Europe, or the refusal to produce them. If innocent, there will be no difficulty in the way of their production, and if refused, after a formal demand has been made for their production in Parliament, their nature will stand revealed.

Poland must be restored now, or it will be too late.

The danger to be apprehended is that Poland should become a weapon that Russia can use against Europe, instead of a barrier for Europe against Russia. This must result from the continued neglect of Poland by Europe, which will convert the hatred of the Poles against Russia into a fiercer hate, first of the German Powers, and then of all Europe. The indications of this already appear in appeals to the Emperor of Russia for concessions; and even when they take the shape of wishes for National Institutions, it is coupled with no expression of aspirations for independence of Russia.

Disappointment, ambition, and revenge must ultimately become the moving impulses of the Poles, and precipitate them upon Europe.

The English Government, so far from seeing the danger of a reconciliation of the Poles and the Russians, have, since the Russian war, spoken of Poland only to express their hopes that the Emperor of Russia would see the wisdom of conciliating his Polish subjects, so that the latter might become loyal to his crown. It has thus openly expressed the wish that Russia may be strengthened by Poland, instead of Poland being strong as a bulwark against Russia. No language can be so well calculated to paralyze the German Powers; for with them the alternative has always been between the establishment of a strong and independent Power in Poland, by which Russia would cease to be their neighbour, or the retention of their portions of Poland to prevent their being also incorporated with Russia. It is necessary to give some hope to the Poles *now*, to prevent their becoming the sword with which Russia will destroy Europe.

Signed on behalf of the Deputation,

J. T. HARLOW.
C. F. JONES.
DAVID RULE.
JOHN YOUNG.

July 17, 1861.


* Lord Lansdowne, June 17, 1850.

The Dispositions of the Continental Powers in reference to the Restoration of Poland.

From the Speech of Count Zamoyski, delivered at the Whittington Club, London, July 11, 1861, before the Committee for obtaining the Suppressed Polish Despatches.

In 1831 we rose against the power that held us in bondage. I can speak with knowledge of the circumstances of this rising. I belonged to a family, many of whom were men who had the guidance of public affairs, and I can tell you that my own judgment deplored the insurrection. I did all I could to prevent it. There was a difference of opinion as to the policy of rising, but when the thing was done we were all united. We fought and we were conquered. What then was the

conduct of two out of three of the partitioning Powers? This is the object for the meeting to consider. Prussia, in 1831, assisted Russia. I know nothing, in 1831, that I can trace to the credit of Prussia. She brought evils alike on herself and others from the annihilation of Poland. But Austria did not wait; she seized the opportunity of showing her aversion to Russian aggression. Russia had gone to war with Turkey in 1828, and immediately Prince Metternich put the Austrian army



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on a war footing as a menace to Russia. The attitude of Austria, with 400,000 men in arms, being unfriendly to Russia, and the miserable way in which the Turkish war was conducted—the Russian army gaining victories by gold—discredited Russia in the eyes of Europe. The attitude of Austria, there can be no doubt, contributed considerably to stop the aggression of Russia on Turkey. At that very time Austria appointed as Governor in Galicia a Bohemian gentleman of high birth; and of high character, which is nobler than high birth. He showed himself particularly Polish, and he became very popular as Governor of Galicia; but Russia, seeing that, intrigued, and got him discharged after the fall of Poland. He was kept in his place during the Polish struggle, because during that time Russia had no hold on Austria; but the moment Poland fell, Austria was in the hands of Russia, the Governor was removed, and the administration of the Austrians in Galicia took quite a contrary direction. I remember, when the insurrection broke out in Warsaw, the people looked up to the Austrian Consul as their friend. There was no English Consul and no French Consul. The Austrian Consul, poor man! could do nothing to aid the people, but his demeanour showed the attitude of Austria. No impediment was raised in the way of any man in Galicia passing the frontier, and joining the army. We had several regiments formed of Galicians. I was thrown into Galicia after the war. The Russians took the fortress, and I slipped away in disguise, and went straight to the Governor at Lemburg. He received me, and did not disclose my disguise. These matters may appear unimportant, but they are indicative of the policy of the Austrian Government. Austria, at that very time, far from being offended at the Galicians, actually supported the insurrection. The Emperor of Austria issued a proclamation to the Province in which he announced that six months' taxes would be remitted as a token of gratitude for their conduct during the struggle. Their conduct consisted in collecting money and men and sending them to the Polish insurrection; not to rise against Austria, because it was an instruction from Warsaw that nobody should rise against Austria. Now, gentlemen, perhaps you have seen what appeared in the *Examiner* of last week touching the policy of Austria. The Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Government at the Congress of Vienna was Prince Metternich. Now, the Prince, during the Polish insurrection of 1831, concealed himself from the Russian Embassy, but he saw the Polish Envoy every evening receiving him by the back door of his house. He conferred with him, and expressed the greatest sympathy with Poland, but regretted he could do nothing so long as England and France took no action. He actually ended every conference about Poland by saying to the Polish Envoy—

"My dear friend, you lose your time here; you should go to the Governments of Paris and London. We cannot move without having the assurance and security that they are determined to do the thing in earnest—to check Russia at once and for ever." (Loud cheers.)

But notwithstanding the indifference shown in Paris and London, Prince Metternich ended by openly receiving the Polish Envoy, and presenting him to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna as the accredited agent of the Polish National Government. The resistance of the Poles lasted long enough to make the Russian Ambassador think that he ought to risk anything to smooth over the difficulty, and he actually consented, at the request of Prince Metternich, that his own Secretary of Embassy should start for Warsaw with propositions to Prince Paskiewitz who was then commanding before that city.

Now, I think these are facts which show what Austria would have done in the struggle, if governments with eyes and hearts had existed in London and Paris during that time. I cannot resist citing this fact, which also is related in the *Examiner*. The Emperor, Francis the Second, of Austria, sent a message through his Minister, to the Polish Envoy, and it was to this effect:

"The Emperor feels that he is drawing near his end. He is about to appear before the great Judge. The possession of Galicia weighs upon his conscience as a crime, and he would be happy to restore it to Poland, provided that it would not be annexed to Russia." (Loud applause.)

A few years afterwards, the Plenipotentiary of England at Vienna was Lord Holland, who was then Mr. Henry Fox. He took occasion to observe to Prince Metternich that he was surprised Austria did not see the benefit which she would derive from the restoration of Poland. Not knowing what had happened before, he said Austria had remained quiet, not apprehending the immense interest she had in the restoration of Poland. This was in 1835. Metternich's answer was:—

"Do you think we do not know and understand that? Give me the assurance that Poland will be restored in twenty four hours, and I will subscribe to it at once. But do you think it is an easy matter to accomplish? It wants the assistance of you English and French. Give me the assurance that you are willing to do it, and I am ready. I will ask no compensation for Galicia. The compensation, of course, would be the re-establishment of the barrier between ourselves and Russia."

Lord Palmerston has argued that Austria would not move for the restoration of Poland. I beg Lord Palmerston's pardon.

Austria has no power of her own. I am not likely to lie under any suspicion of a liking for Austria. I make, however, a great distinction between her administration and her diplomacy.

I pass on now to the war of 1853, when Russia was on one side and England and France were on the other. Up went the Ambassadors of the German Powers in the middle of 1853, before the Russians had crossed the Pruth, and asked your Ministers of Foreign Affairs, "What, in this quarrel with Russia, are you going to do with Poland?" The answer was, "Oh, Poland! we have nothing to do with Poland; we only mean to check Russia. Poland we take every possible interest in, but we do not think it is the question. We are, however, ready to listen to you. What do you propose?" (Hear.) Now Austria never proposes; she waits for propositions. Austria then withdrew. A curious fact it is that one of the Foreign Ministers, who was applied to, actually boasted to me of having given this answer to the Austrian agent.

He thought Austria was afraid of losing Galicia. But the Austrian was of another mind. I told him they might be quite safe about that. The Austrian again inquired of the foreign Minister how far he was in earnest about checking Russia. He said, "Do you think of Poland in making war against Russia?" "No," said the Foreign Minister. Then said the Austrian agent, "Very well; we know what the war is about, and we abstain." (Applause.) What I am telling you, gentlemen, is not hearsay. The Polish Envoy at Vienna, in 1831, was nobody else but my own brother; so I have that from a good source. Therefore, gentlemen, if that has been the conduct of Austria—if we examine what she has done in 1815, in 1829, in 1831, in 1835, and again in 1853, we shall see that so many times she has voluntarily offered to restore Poland if England and France had concurred. (Applause.) As to Prussia, I know much less. She holds a smaller portion of Polish territory than Austria. If you look at this map you will see the Russian possessions (tracing them on the map.) This red line is the Carpathian Mountains. Galicia you see on the other side (pointing to the map), and it is the natural frontier of Austria. Now, Austria never considered that her possession of Galicia would be of long duration. She was ready to make the sacrifice, though the population was five millions. The inhabitants were good soldiers and the soil was good, but still the danger of neighbourhood was far superior to any advantages Austria derived from the possession of Galicia; therefore it was for her advantage to give it up. Prussia holds a population of two millions, and she is more anxious to preserve her possession than her Austrian neighbour. Therefore I do not look for the same voluntary offer from Prussia that I expect from Austria. Still, I have had personal occasions of judging; and the manifestations of Prussia have been of a striking nature. There was the declaration of the King of Prussia in 1815. He paid the highest compliments to his Polish subjects for their devotion to the national cause, and he paid respect to the feelings of the inhabitants by imposing no other oath of allegiance than the old oath of fidelity. Then there was a sort of fulfilment of the engagement of 1815, in the appointment of a Polish Viceroy. This lasted up to 1831, when Russia crushed the Kingdom of Poland, and Prussia strengthened her position in it. They saw that the alternative opened up to them by the Treaty was restoration or annihilation, and they went for annihilation. But in 1853, 54, and 55—I am assured of this by authorities whom I consider worthy of the highest respect—Prussia and Austria considered that, if a serious war was to be made against Russia, it could not be made in the Crimea. A serious war could be made nowhere else than on Polish territory.

Both of them were ready to join in such a war, but they did not feel disposed to trust to words. It was, I have been told, stipulated by Austria and Prussia that England and France were to send 100,000 men to Poland. That was the condition of co-operation on the part of Austria and Prussia. An English diplomatist, who was passing the other day through Berlin on his way home from Russian Poland, was told by a gentleman well acquainted with the state of things in Prussia, that every man in the country who aspires to the qualification of a statesman is at this hour disgusted with the Polish subjects of Prussia being under her dominion, on account of the splendid attitude which my countrymen have maintained. These Prussian gentlemen are so sick of their possession of Poland, that they would give it up, provided that it should not be made a present to Russia. (Cheers.)

I have now to speak of Turkey and Sweden, the two extremities of the barrier of which Poland is the centre; Turkey, which holds the Dardanelles, Sweden, which borders on the Sound, whilst Poland is the link between them. As regards the Sultan, permit me first to remind you that, at the time of the original partition of Poland, he and the Pope were the only sovereigns in Europe who actually protested against it. This silence on the part of the sovereigns of the time, notwithstanding the universal cry of horror and indignation which the act elicited from their people, certainly accounts for many a convulsion among the latter, who saw a convincing proof that, in the estimation of their leaders, whether on the throne or in the government, right and justice in matters of state were subjects of

mere expediency, and who were thereby led to the conclusion that, henceforth, nothing would have weight in such matters but what men's passions and interests might suggest, and what force and intrigue could accomplish. To show how interests were served by the new method, I need only allude to the motive then put forward by the British Government for their non-intervention; viz., "That British trade would not suffer by the partition." Now, Poland was a free-trader of long standing, and had carried on, for centuries, an extensive trade with England. Russia and Prussia at once introduced the system of prohibition.

Turkey, like Sweden, has, ever since Poland's partition, been the field of Russian aggression and intrigue. Like Sweden, she has lost extensive provinces, which have become the prey of Russia. In 1812 she joined in the war against Russia; and England's interference it was that made her conclude a peace and abandon Bessarabia, which, in 1856, England's influence again tried to wrest from Russia, and a part of which only it succeeded in restoring to Turkey. Then again, in 1828 and 1829, when Austria, by her threatening attitude, obliged Russia to desist from her unjustifiable attack upon Turkey, England and France contented themselves with sending their ambassadors to the head quarters—not of the Turks who were defending themselves from invasion, but of the Russians, whose aim it was to seize upon Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

Turkey had hardly yet recovered from her losses in 1829, when, in 1831, she, like Persia and Austria, gave proofs of her willingness to prevent Russia from crushing the Polish insurrectionary army; and the attention that the French Ambassador at Constantinople gave to their proposals was the cause of his recal, at the very time when a similar proposal on the part of France had been rejected by Great Britain.

In 1853, the Czar Nicholas again attacked Turkey. What was the Sultan's first act after the declaration of war? The Turks are supposed to know little of the world; yet it appears they knew what other Governments either cannot or will not be prevailed upon to believe—that Poland is the real, the only, means of resisting Russia effectually. The Sultan had a fine and disciplined army of 150,000 men; yet the Poles—not the Poles of Poland, but simply the few refugees residing in various countries—were by him considered allies worthy of being appealed to. He at once invited us to come and raise the Polish standard under his banner. He knew—what others to this very day, perhaps, still doubt—the power which that standard alone, with a handful of men, would add to his means of resisting Russia. Others either knew not, or would not know. England and France, the Sultan's friends, before becoming his allies in the war, positively objected to his forming a Polish corps. They continued their objection when they had themselves declared war with Russia; and it was not until they began to suffer in the Crimea that they at last permitted Turkey to organize the Poles, who for a whole year had been offering their services in vain. The rejection of an auxiliary force of such importance, which would inevitably have been joined by masses of men coming, not only from Poland, but from the very ranks of the Russian army, of which they constitute one-fourth, had caused incalculable damage to Turkey. And what were the reasons assigned by both of the allies of Turkey? The very reason so fatally and mischievously put forward whenever Poland has been alluded to as *the* means, the only means, of resisting and checking, once for ever, the power of Russia; viz., the idle supposition that Austria, because she was a party to Poland's dismemberment in the last century, and to the suppression of Cracow in 1846, must necessarily be averse to anything tending to the reconstruction of that country; whereas it is evident, that unless that reconstruction is effected before long, Austria's hours are numbered, for her neighbour will know how first to convulse and then to annihilate and suppress her. Austria knows and feels this, and, whenever she has dared, has hinted as much. But it appears no one will either believe her, or judge for himself what the policy of Austria should be that she may escape ruin. It is true that Austria was not at that time lost sight of by the Allies. They tried to persuade her to join in the war, and actually believed they had compromised her for good in the eyes of Russia, when she consented to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia, after the Russians had evacuated those two provinces. It was remarked at the time that "it was immoral on the part of the Allies thus to mislead poor innocent Austria into a course the consequences of which, in her inexperience, she might not foresee." But Austria, whose first minister, Prince Schwartzberg, had only a few years before been heard to say, when alluding to the assistance lent to his Sovereign against the Hungarians, "Austria will one day astound the world by her ingratitude;" Austria, would not stir; she saw at once that the Crimean expedition was no war; above all, she saw that Poland was not made the object of the war, and that, consequently, Russia could suffer no harm by it, and that after such a war, she (Austria) would find herself again, on the restoration of peace, in the position in which she has been since the dismemberment of Poland; viz., the neighbour of Russia—

of Russia deeply offended and burning with revenge. The Allies being engaged in a sham war with Russia, Austria thought she had better not make war at all. And now we hear it stated coolly in the House of Commons that it is idle to say that Austria would have joined the Allies in 1854 against Russia, because in 1846 she had, in concert with Russia and Prussia, annexed Cracow to her dominions. That this was a "shameful" proceeding, as Lord Palmerston properly described it, nobody can deny; but that her proceedings in 1846 should have bound her for ever to the interests and views of Russia is an assertion which hardly deserves to be seriously entertained.

Let me add a few words as to Sweden. A French ambassador, no less than marshal Canrobert himself, was, in the beginning of 1855, sent to Stockholm. The King of Sweden, whose ministers had long been under the absolute control of Russia, at once determined to ascertain whether France and her Ally were really in earnest regarding Russia. His confidential agent arrived in Paris, and not being there in any official character, sought an audience, not, as might have been supposed, with the Emperor, but with Prince Czartoryski. He asked him, as the representative of Poland, what *he* thought of the war. He added—

"My master knows what his position is. He admits that he may still die a king; but, unless something interfere, he knows his son can be nothing but a vassal of Russia. In Poland and by Poland the scales may be reversed; if the Allies think of Poland, if they are determined to restore her to independence, my King and my country will readily join them, and cheerfully bear the risk of exposing themselves to the wrath of a powerful neighbour."

You will guess Prince Czartoryski's answer! Yet at that very time, late in 1855, the formation of a Polish corps, in England's pay, had at length been decided on; but though recruited exclusively among Poles, the corps was not allowed to call itself by its true name, nor to bear its true standard. However, it was a beginning; and had the war only been continued during 1856, and carried into the mainland of the Russian possessions; that corps, such as it was, depend upon it, Gentlemen, would, in a short time, have become a Polish army, an army of 50,000, and soon of 100,000 men, whose officers and men would have been recruited from Poles forced into the Russian ranks.

I will only add a few words about France, if you are willing to grant me a few minutes more of your indulgent attention. France, as a nation, is, from old recollections, and perhaps also from certain affinities of character, the country, of all others, which has always shown the greatest interest in the condition of Poland. Speak to a Frenchman of Poland, and directly his heart beats more strongly. His Government, which never ceased to give its munificent assistance to the Polish exiles, may at times think itself justified, in consequence of that very supposed hopelessness of the case of Poland, in listening to the proposals of her enemies, or in pursuing any other object that may suit its views; even the French nation at large may at times dream of the possibility of extending her frontiers and influence by allowing Russia to extend hers. But let Poland's case again be brought to light, let the French believe that something can be done for Poland, and he must be blind indeed who does not perceive that every Frenchman that lives on the soil of that noble country will at once recoil from any further understanding with the enemy of Poland. And this feeling will soon make itself known with a degree of unanimity that will leave the Government itself no alternative but to give it its serious attention. France, as a nation, may have many faults imputed to her; but her pride and ambition is to be the enlightening torch of civilization, and she knows that the torch brandished by Russia is that of destruction, subjugation, and barbarism. Unite with her she may, so long as she can make it her interest to join in the views and pursuits of Russia; but it wants little to make her feel the shame of such a course; and if there is a watchword that has the power of thus bringing France to a sense of what she owes to herself and to the world, it is that of Poland—a word whose spell can at once rouse and purify her.

Whenever Great Britain, with her mighty voice and her well-known perseverance in a cause she has once matured and adopted, will pronounce that word of "Poland," and show that Poland's restoration to the rights and position which were stipulated for her by the treaties of 1815, has become a part, and an important part, of her plans and general policy, she may safely expect the most ready, the most hearty concurrence of France, both as a government and as a nation. In many instances has France in vain attempted to make Great Britain join her for the rescue of Poland; Louis XV. tried it with George III. Louis Philippe and Prince Talleyrand in 1831, and the Government of Emperor Napoleon in 1855, tried it with the British Government, but always in vain. May we not, since the two leading Statesmen of that Government have loudly proclaimed their conviction that Poland will and must, in the course of time, by the merits and civic virtues of her own sons, resume her position among the nations of Europe, henceforward expect to see that Government mature its plans of action with reference to such a contingency? May not, nay, ought not, the loud expression of the conviction that such a contingency will arise, to

be followed by the no less loud profession of an unflinching persistence, if not in the enforcement of treaty rights, at least in the repeal of the sanction of England to the violation of those rights? And would not her indifference to such violation be necessarily implied in a prolonged silence?

But, whatever may be the decision of the Government, it certainly behoves you, gentlemen, to urge these considerations upon the minds of your countrymen. It is the noble attribute and duty of free citizens to watch, perhaps even to distrust and denounce, at all events, carefully to scrutinize the acts of their Governments, wherever doubt may be entertained as to their acting in accordance with the honour, the interest, and the pledged faith of the nation. Your position and duties in this free and powerful country form that complement of self-government which one of your statesmen so happily called "Her Majesty's Opposition." But those duties, which are also your glorious rights, are neither my rights nor my duties. I have come to meet you in compliance with a request to which I felt bound to respond; I feel ever ready and prepared to give evidence of what, in a great part, is my personal knowledge of this question. I honestly believe I have related to you the truth and nothing but the truth. I have not attempted to pass, either on facts, or still less on persons, judgments which have not already received universal sanction. I have acted before you the part of a mere witness. It is for you, not for me, if the facts I have narrated deserve your attention, to use them for the furtherance of what you, as citizens of Great Britain, will think consistent with your sense of duty. I have not spoken to you in behalf of Poland; I have laid before you facts for your consideration as Britons.

Poland an "Internal" Affair of Russia.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL,
House of Commons, July 3, 1861.

"There are Powers with whom you may hold most friendly communication, even with respect to their own INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS; but with regard to Russia, as I have said on former occasions, I cannot believe that any representation we could make upon the subject of the Russian Government in Poland, would be met in any other way than by a declaration that the Government was conducted in the best manner, and the advice of England respecting it was quite out of place. If that be the case, would it become us to make useless representations? Is there any one who will say that we ought, either by ourselves or by endeavouring to form alliances with other Powers, to break with Russia—to make war, in fine, with Russia with the view of establishing the independence of Poland."

"I offer no opinion with regard to the institutions that have been lately given to Poland; but they are institutions which seem to me to derive all their authority, and to depend for the spirit in which they are to be administered upon the WILL OF THE EMPEROR, as they are all to depend for their existence on his pleasure."

LORD CLARENDON,
House of Lords, July 11, 1856.

"It was intended by the English and French Plenipotentiaries to have brought the subject of Poland before the Paris Conferences; but thinking it might prejudice, rather than advance the cause, we did not do so. I know that the mere rumour of a general amnesty produced the greatest enthusiasm at Warsaw in favour of the Emperor, and justified us as to our belief, when at Paris, that a large measure of the kind would be completely successful, and would render the inhabitants of Poland loyal and grateful, instead of continuing a source of disquietude to the Russian Government. If the Emperor does anything for Poland it must be his own spontaneous act."

THE SAME, April, 1857.

"HER Majesty's Government feel perfect confidence in the Emperor of Russia."

